INPO evaluation teams spend approximately 2 weeks at each plant, interviewing plant personnel and watching their actions on the job. Nevertheless, the committee quickly came to understand that the lack of a strong nuclear safety culture was an important contributing factor to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. Decision-Making ..... 26 Respectful Work Environment ..... 30 The accident prompted widespread evacuations of local populations, large economic losses, and the eventual shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan. In its final safety culture policy statement (USNRC, 2011b), the USNRC notes that assessments of incidents involving U.S. civilian uses of nuclear materials demonstrate that significant mistakes occur when safety culture is weak. Its regulation was entrusted to the same government bureaucracy responsible for its promotion…. The report also noted that TEPCO “manipulated the cozy relationship with the regulators to take the teeth out of regulations” (2012, p. 20). The model, it says, is a comprehensive tool intended for all organisations that deal directly or indirectly with ionizing radiation, enabling them to set goals, implement changes, and measure progress. The NRA is responsible for promulgating rules and regulations for nuclear plants and is also charged with evaluating whether current Japanese plants can resume operations (Bacon-Dussault, 2013; Ferguson and Jansson, 2013; Geller, 2014). Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture – INPO 12-012 Addendum I – rev.0 – Apr2013. ties and regulatory agencies whereby when a senior-level person retires, his junior would take his place (Wang and Chen, 2012). Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features? As an independent federal agency, the USNRC is not part of the executive branch of the federal government—although as a matter of policy it generally follows the laws, regulations, and guidance that apply to executive agencies. INPO also provides technical consulting to its member companies on an as-needed basis. Some members note that there is a natural tension between the regulator, which ultimately answers to the public and its representatives in Congress, and the regulated industry, which answers to its shareholders. The principle of “effective independence,” as explained by the IAEA, defines the international nuclear communities’ commitment to strong and effective regulation: The government shall ensure that the regulatory body is effectively independent in its safety related decision making and that it has functional separation from entities having responsibilities or interests that could unduly influence its decision making. Only by grasping this mindset can one understand how Japan’s nuclear industry managed to avoid absorbing the critical lessons learned from Three Mile Island and Chernobyl; and how it became accepted practice to resist regulatory pressure and cover up small-scale accidents. Learning this message and putting it into practice is a starting point, duty and responsibility of those who are involved with nuclear energy. (UCS, 2013a, p. 5). 6 WANO is an international not-for-profit organization comprising nuclear power companies and associated organizations with a mission to promote nuclear safety. The Government of Japan acknowledged the need for a strong nuclear safety culture by entering into the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Three of the six reactors at the plant sustained severe core damage and released hydrogen and radioactive materials. Decision making reflects safety first. Additionally, plant owners have established safety review groups, usually as a requirement of their USNRC licenses. safety culture are described, and several definitions of safety culture given. Kaufmann and Penciakova (2011) suggest that “[t]o a significant extent, it appears that regulatory capture of NISA by Japan’s nuclear industry turned the regulator into a caretaker of industry rather than one for public safety.” NISA’s lack of regulatory independence has been described as a significant problem in regulatory practice (Dorfman, 2012; Wang and Chen, 2012; Benz, 2013). However, there is strong evidence for a deficient safety culture in both of these organizations: • As noted in Chapter 3, for example, TEPCO and its nuclear regulator failed to take strong and timely action to implement improved seismic and tsunami safety standards for the Fukushima plants. These groups consist of people who are independent of the plant and utility and typically include people who have served in high-level positions in the industry and the USNRC. All of these stakeholders seek to influence USNRC actions, which is traditional in the U.S. system of government. Because NISA lacks full-time technical experts to draw up comprehensive regulations, it depended largely on retired or active engineers from nuclear-industry-related companies to set rulemaking. However, there are enough slips, trips and fall that occur nationwide to suggest that many people apparently don’t (they actually do—it’s not paying attention to where their feet are that causes a … 1, Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture, April 2013. It was this mindset that led to the disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant. To be effectively independent, the regulatory body shall have sufficient authority and sufficient staffing and shall have access to sufficient financial resources for the proper discharge of its assigned responsibilities. Lessons Learned: Nuclear Safety Culture. I 1 Safety culture: An organization 5 values i 1 and behaviors-modeled by its leaders and internalized by its members-that serve to I ! ees feel free to raise safety concerns, both to their management and to the [US]NRC, without fear of retaliation” (USNRC, 2005, p. 2). UCS has been issuing annual reports on the performance of the USNRC (UCS, 2011b, 2012, 2013b; Lochbaum, 2014). The evaluation team meets daily, prepares a report, and presents that report to plant management and to the utility’s chief nuclear and chief executive officers. 75-INSAG-3, IAEA, Vienna (1988). by Congress; moreover, the agency is ultimately answerable to Congress, particularly to its authorizing and appropriation committees (Gutierrez and Polonsky, 2007). [US]NRC appears to have informally established an unreasonably high burden of requiring absolute proof of a safety problem, versus lack of reasonable assurance of maintaining public health and safety, before it will act to shut down a power plant. Security culture is defined as the assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behaviour of individuals, organizations and institutions that support and enhance nuclear security. 10 The letters can be found at http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Minority.PressReleases&ContentRecord_id=a79c7514-cf71-9bab-769a-0f4d16587726&Region_id=&Issue_id= and http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/letters/20130115NRC.pdf. It has instituted several important efforts to foster and improve a safety culture at U.S. nuclear power plants. Some utilities have also voluntarily established high-level independent review groups that visit the plant and report to the utility’s senior management and/or board of directors (INPO, 2005). On the other hand, regulators can become ineffective or even captured by the nuclear industry if independence is lost. (INPO, 2013, p. 6). No one in the organization is exempt from the obligation to ensure safety first. The reports are also available at INPO for review by the USNRC. In order to establish an effective safety culture, senior management must lead by example. Do you enjoy reading reports from the Academies online for free? The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has published a policy statement on nuclear safety culture, but that statement does not contain implementation steps or specific requirements for industry adoption. Attributes: • Managers and supervisors practice visible leadership in the field by placing “eyes on the problem,” coaching, mentoring, and reinforcing standards. (USNRC, 1989, p. 3425). 14 Available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/speeches/2014/s-14-002.pdf. Our goal as legislators and yours as regulators should be to preserve that balance. or economic conditions, or pressures from government departments or from other organizations. Public feedback from such disclosures might also improve the quality of safety culture assessment and improvement activities. The IAEA has also published guidance on enhancing the safety culture in nuclear installations (IAEA, 2002). Available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energycommerce.house.gov/files/letters/20130115NRC. RECOMMENDATION 7.2A: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the U.S. nuclear power industry must maintain and continuously monitor a strong nuclear safety culture in all of their safety-related activities. Nuclear plants must be—and must also be seen by the public to be—safe and well regulated. The concept of nuclear safety culture applies to every employee in the nuclear organization, from the. Apply to Intelligence Analyst, Environmental Health and Safety Officer, Intern and more! They point out that the Union of Concerned Scientists also sent a letter to the USNRC11 urging it to reject requests to weaken critical post-Fukushima safety reforms or slow down their implementation. 11 Available at http://www.ucsusa.org/news/press_release/nrc-should-reject-calls-to.html. INPO provides biannual evaluations of nuclear plant operations (see Sidebar 7.2). Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Leadership Safety Values and Actions ..... 17. The results of INPO’s inspection program are shared among INPO members, but such information is not made available to the public. Indeed, this commitment to safety is, SIDEBAR 7.2 Most notably, the. To have this authority, a regulator must have the ability to make truly independent safety decisions, with the confidence that those decisions won’t be overturned for political reasons. Reviewing performance at every US reactor about every two years has required the effort of some 13,000 individual experts over the years, said Ellis. Developing a corporate safety culture is fundamental to an organization. You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Safety Culture requires all duties important to safety to be carried out correctly, with alertness, due thought and full knowledge, sound judgement and a proper sense of accountability. Continuing public support for nuclear power depends on the safe operation of nuclear plants. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 abolished the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and reorganized its functions into two new agencies: the USNRC became responsible for the regulation of civilian nuclear activities and the Energy Research and Development Administration (which subsequently became part of the Department of Energy) became responsible for nuclear energy research and promotion. This was the only material preventing a breach of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and leak of radioactive coolant into the containment building. Moreover, licensees are not required to adopt it or modify inconsistent practices. New INPO documents on nuclear safety culture – Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture: Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture – INPO 12-012 rev.1 – Apr2013. While regulators need to be independent of the organizations they regulate, they must exercise their regulatory authority in ways that support robust programs at nuclear power plants to identify and correct problems before they become significant safety issues. This chapter is organized into four sections: Section 7.1 describes the nuclear safety culture concept. [1] Safety culture and security culture coexist and reinforce one another through the shared common Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture describes the essential traits and attributes of a healthy nuclear safety culture, with the goal of creating a framework for open discussion and continuing evolution of safety culture throughout the commercial nuclear energy industry. (NAIIC, 2012, p. 9). The U.S. nuclear industry, acting through the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, has voluntarily established nuclear safety culture programs and mechanisms for evaluating their implementation at nuclear plants. The policy statement also does not contain specific implementation steps. This requires independent (and wise) technical and policy judgments by USNRC staff and commissioners. Nevertheless, analysts who have studied Japan’s regulatory structure have shown that Japanese nuclear safety regulators were subject to regulatory capture prior to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. SIDEBAR 7.1 For example, NAIIC chairman Dr. Kiyoshi Kurokawa concluded that the, accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant cannot be regarded as a natural disaster. Analysts have described two practices that hindered effective regulatory control and impeded the implementation of a strong nuclear safety culture (Dorfman, 2012; Wang and Chen, 2012; Aoki and Rothwell, 2013). It leaves implementation to licensees and recommends that implementation begin immediately. A selection of committee views is provided in this section to frame the committee’s recommendations in Section 7.4. Effective Safety Communication ..... 13. LA.8 a. The shared responsibilities for nuclear plant safety are described in Sidebar 7.1. The nuclear industry and its regulators can work together to promote nuclear safety, especially through the development of common understandings of problems and potential solutions. These examples are described in the following paragraphs. 5š¬f²Fcü›xÓ}XYxVÏß…5ˆ¬ş6Àé°²}X¯G7ƒË»ƒ|œ�)YCê…G �ö!ıwÿ‡§GÎÄ“��ç©ÃF[ø@v lÖxšÓP‹–“ :kß]¨ƒºÅtR²Yן�µ2€ ÁnĞü#À ¨ß² Not a MyNAP member yet? Safety is at the heart of our culture, and everyone who works for us believes it, lives it and breathes it. Continuous learning: Opportunities to learn about ways to ensure safety are sought out and implemented. Chapters 3 and 4 of this report describe TEPCO’s preparation for and response to the earthquake and tsunami. Taken together, these examples provide evidence of a continuing lack of safety focus in the period prior to the Fukushima Daiichi accident. 7 Nuclear plant safety begins with a plant’s design and construction and extends through its full life cycle including operation, maintenance, and, inevitably, decommissioning. It is also essential that the USNRC balance the interests of those outside parties with those of the broader public. The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami sparked a humanitarian disaster in northeastern Japan. The World Association of Nuclear Operators6 has joined INPO in recognizing the centrality of the nuclear safety culture for nuclear plant operations worldwide.7. This report by the IAEA’s International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group INSAG describes the concept of ‘Safety Culture’ in connection with nuclear plant safety in relation to both organi- zations and individuals engaged in nuclear power activities. Security culture is a major component of safety culture. A system that encourages problem identification, reporting, and correction will operate most effectively when regulatory agencies use sound judgment to prioritize reported problems according to their safety significance. Nuclear safety is defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as "The achievement of proper operating conditions, prevention of accidents or mitigation of accident consequences, resulting in protection of workers, the public and the environment from undue radiation hazards". • As noted in Chapters 2 and 4, Japanese regulatory agencies did not inform utilities of the USNRC’s B.5.b requirements for responding to beyond-design-basis events even after the USNRC made them public. INPO was established to promote excellence, safety, and reliability in nuclear plant operations (see Sidebar 7.2). Prior to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, there were some clear differences between the nuclear regulatory system in Japan and the United States. Plants that receive a high rating are eligible for a discount on their liability insurance provided by an industry insurance organization. These are referred to as amakudari and amaagari (Wang and Chen, 2012; Wang et al., 2013; see also Schaede, 1995): • Amakudari means “descent from heaven” and it refers to the practice of hiring retired, high-profile public officials for private-sector jobs (Horiuchi and Shimizu, 2001; Dorfman, 2012; Wang and Chen, 2012). For purposes of this report, safety culture is perhaps best understood as those organizational processes that ultimately influence and reinforce an organizational culture that emphasizes safety. The safety culture policy statement is not a regulation. Regulator. • TEPCO has admitted to falsifying reports to its regulator in 29 cases between 1988 and 1998 and to frauds in safety-related inspections at the Fukushima Daiichi plant in 1993-1994. The USNRC issued prescriptive fire safety regulations following a fire at the Browns Ferry nuclear plant (located in Alabama) in 1975. The USNRC defines a safety-conscious work environment as an “environment in which employ-. However, the report’s contents are described in a paper by a WANO staff member (Brumfield, 2012). The nuclear safety message is communicated frequently and consistently, occasionally as a stand-alone theme. Furthermore, the regulatory body shall be able to give independent advice to government departments and governmental bodies on matters relating to the safety of facilities and activities. Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants is a study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. The International Atomic Energy Agency's newly-published Harmonised Safety Culture Model describes the traits and attributes that are observed when a strong culture for safety is present. (IAEA, 2002, p. 3), There is international acceptance by the nuclear power community that a strong nuclear safety culture needs to be adopted universally: by senior management of organizations operating nuclear power plants, by individuals who work in those plants, and by regulatory bodies and other organizations that set nuclear power policies. Preamble Clause iv and Article 10 of the Convention note that, Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that all. We need to look not just at the way we manage programs, but also at the way we manage people. For example, a nuclear power plant in the United States can log over 100 “problems” daily requiring some sort of corrective action, but many of these problems typically have low safety significance. This report has limited distribution. The remaining thickness of the [reactor pressure vessel] head in the wastage area was found to be approximately 3/8 inch which was the stainless steel cladding on the inside surface of the RPV head. Lessons Learned makes recommendations to improve plant systems, resources, and operator training to enable effective ad hoc responses to severe accidents. Nuclear safety undergoes constant examination. (USNRC, 2011b). (2014, pp. A well established national safety culture depends not only on nuclear operators to meet the highest standards, but also on a nuclear authority to keep the national requirements updated and to require modernization of plants when necessary. 1. Additionally, the leadership of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission must maintain the independence of the regulator. Committee members have a range of views about the current status of the nuclear safety culture in the United States. The USNRC staff had articulated this standard to the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) as a rationale for allowing Davis-Besse to operate until February 16, 2002, even in light of information that strongly indicated Davis-Besse was not in compliance with USNRC regulations and plant technical specifications and may have operated with reduced safety margins. RECOMMENDATION 7.2B: The U.S. nuclear industry and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission should examine opportunities to increase the transparency of and communication about their efforts to assess and improve their nuclear safety cultures. the Government Accountability Office, which conduct independent investigations of USNRC and industry actions; and public interest organizations, which offer technical critiques and advice. (OIG, 2002, p. 14), An investigation of the incident by the USNRC’s Office of the Inspector General noted that. The Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO; see Sidebar 7.2) has published guidance on the nuclear safety culture for the U.S. power industry (INPO, 2013). The term nuclear safety culture combines two concepts: safety and culture: • Safety is protection from harm and can be defined in terms of risk: an activity is considered to be safe when its associated risks are being controlled to acceptable levels. Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. FINDING 7.1: While the Government of Japan acknowledged the need for a strong nuclear safety culture prior to the Fukushima Daiichi accident, TEPCO and its nuclear regulators were deficient in establishing, implementing, and maintaining such a culture. A recent letter from a House congressional committee9 stressed the importance of balance in USNRC regulatory decisions: In the Atomic Energy Act, Congress declared that nuclear energy should “make the maximum contribution to the general welfare (Section 1 (a))” which recognizes nuclear energy’s vital role in contributing to our nation’s energy security. with nuclear safety culture monitoring, please contact James Slider, NEI senior project manager for this document, via e-mail to jes@nei.org, or via phone number (202) 739-8015. At about the same time, the Center for Strategic and International Studies recommended (CSIS, 1999) that the USNRC and the industry should strive to work in a more informal and constructive atmosphere and conduct an open dialogue with the public to arrive at regulatory procedures. 6. In choosing such language, Congress endeavored to balance the benefits of nuclear energy with protection of public health and safety. 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