Wolfish was exclusively concerned with the constitutionality of conditions of pretrial incarceration under circumstances in which the legitimacy of the incarceration itself was undisputed; the Court avoided any discussion of the showing a State must make in order to justify pretrial detention in the first instance. "There do not appear to be any governing criteria which must be followed by the probation officer in choosing between proposing detention and parole. The argument that § 320.5(3)(b) serves "the State's parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child,'" ante at 467 U. S. 265 (citation omitted), now appears particularly hollow. Parson's case is not unique. United States v. Raines, 362 U. S. 17, 362 U. S. 21 (1960). In the Pennsylvania cases one of the appellants, a 15 year old, was charged with robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods; the other, a 16 year old, was charged with assault on a police officer. There is also no reason, we should add, for a federal court to assume that a state court judge will not strive to apply state law as conscientiously as possible. It is against the backdrop of these findings that the contentions of the parties must be examined. See 513 F. Supp. at 705. ); id. at 420 U. S. 123. 27-28. Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals, in upholding the statute, did not disagree with this explanation of the incidence of its application. In part, this incapacity derives from the limitations of current knowledge concerning the dynamics of human behavior. For the sake of simplicity, offenses covered by the Family Court Act, as well as the more serious offenses enumerated above, hereinafter will be referred to generically as crimes. FCA § 301.1; In re Craig S., 57 App.Div.2d 761, 394 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977). The majority only grudgingly and incompletely acknowledges the applicability of the first of these tests, but its grip on the cases before us is undeniable. Children aged 13 or over accused of murder and children aged 14 or over accused of kidnaping, arson, rape, or a few other serious crimes are exempted from the coverage of the Act, and instead are prosecuted as "juvenile offenders" in the adult criminal courts. A police officer arrested the Defendant at his home and took him onto a public highway. If the juvenile is charged with a lesser offense, then the factfinding hearing must be held not more than three days after the initial appearance. [Footnote 2/27] Nor could an individual detainee avoid the problem of mootness by filing a suit for damages or for injunctive relief. FCA § 307.3(4). Precisely because of the unreliability of any determination whether a particular juvenile is likely to commit a crime between his arrest and trial, see supra at 467 U. S. 293-294, no individual detainee would be able to demonstrate that he would have abided by the law had he been released. But even if these practical difficulties could be surmounted, the majority's proposal would be inadequate. New York statute serve a legitimate state objective? Found that all procedures were The "legitimate and compelling state interest" in protecting the community from crime cannot be doubted. The likelihood of guilt was recommended as a larger Type. Id. § 325.3(3). Two separate inquiries are necessary to answer this question. [Footnote 2/4]. [Footnote 15]. CRIM. The majority purports to see no value in such additional safeguards, contending that activity of estimating the likelihood that a given juvenile will commit a crime in the near future involves subtle assessment of a host of variables, the precise weight of which cannot be determined in advance. The most striking of these cases involve juveniles who have been at large without mishap for a substantial period of time prior to their initial appearances, see supra at 467 U. S. 287, and detainees who are adjudged delinquent and are nevertheless released into the community. the arbitrariness with which it is administered, is bound to disillusion its victims regarding the virtues of our system of criminal justice. Id. A juvenile may arrive at intake by one of three routes: he may be brought there directly by an arresting officer; he may be detained for a brief period after his arrest and then taken to intake; he may be released upon arrest and directed to appear at a designated time. Supreme Court Case Files. The District Court, whose knowledge of New York procedural law surely exceeds ours, concluded that "[t]he short span of pretrial detention makes effective review impossible." Ante at 467 U. S. 280. Contributor Names Rehnquist, William H. (Judge) Supreme Court of the United States (Author) SCHALL v. MARTIN 253 Opinion of the Court JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. See Brief for Appellant in No. ", Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 373-374 (1982). Another Family Court Judge admitted using "preventive detention" to punish one of the juveniles in the sample. There seems no dispute, however, that most of the juveniles held under the latter provision are subjected to "secure detention. Title U.S. Reports: Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984). With the consent of the victim or complainant and the juvenile, the court may also refer a case to the probation service for adjustment. Argued Jan. 17, 1984. An edited and abridged (easy to read) version of the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Schall v. Martin (1984) 467 U.S. 253. 26. In fact, one of the juveniles in the very case histories upon which the court relied was released from pretrial detention on a writ of habeas corpus issued by the State Supreme Court. The boy was kept overnight and brought to juvenile court in the morning for his initial appearance. Appellees argue, however, that the risk of erroneous and unnecessary detentions is too high despite these procedures, because the standard for detention is fatally vague. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d at 690, 350 N.E.2d at 910. This principle underlies prior decisions of the Court involving various constitutional provisions as they relate to pretrial detention. Id. We have also recognized that a prediction of future criminal conduct is "an experienced prediction based on a host of variables" which cannot be readily codified. To decide the cases before us, we need not consider either the feasibility of such a scheme or its constitutionality. Appellees urge the alleged lack of procedural safeguards as an alternative ground for upholding the judgment of the Court of Appeals. His sources of information are the child, his parent or guardian, the arresting officer, and any records of past contacts between the child and the Family Court. He has before him a "petition for delinquency" prepared by a state agency, charging the juvenile with an offense, accompanied with one or more affidavits attesting to the juvenile's involvement. See People ex rel. § 260.171 (1982); Miss.Code Ann. These suggested changes included: limitations on the crimes for which the juvenile has been arrested or which he is likely to commit if released; a determination of the likelihood that the juvenile committed the crime; an assessment of the juvenile's background; and a more specific standard of proof. [Footnote 2/13], In short, fairly viewed, pretrial detention of a juvenile pursuant to § 320.5(3)(b) gives rise to injuries comparable to those associated with imprisonment of an adult. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U. S. 528 (1971) (no right to jury trial). Id. 82-1248, 82-1278. A ___ is the formal complaint that initiates judicial action against a juvenile charged with delinquency or a status offense. A New York federal district court in United States ex rel. The Court of Appeals, of course, did conclude that the underlying purpose of § 320.5(3)(b) is punitive, rather than regulatory. The Family Court judge will make a preliminary determination as to the jurisdiction of the court, appoint a law guardian for the child, and advise the child of his or her rights, including the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. at 713. Martin had possession of the gun when he was arrested. The judge must make his decision whether to detain a juvenile on the basis of a set of allegations regarding the child's alleged offense, a cursory review of his background and criminal record, and the recommendation of a probation officer who, in the typical case, has seen the child only once. Pp. & Jud.Proc.Code Ann. Petitioners' Exhibit 18a. Judge Quinones of the Family Court testified at trial that he and his colleagues make a determination under § 320.5(3)(b) based on numerous factors, including the nature and seriousness of the charges; whether the charges are likely to be proved at trial; the juvenile's prior record; the adequacy and effectiveness of his home supervision; his school situation, if known; the time of day of the alleged crime as evidence of its seriousness and a possible lack of parental control; and any special circumstances that might be brought to his attention by the probation officer, the child's attorney, or any parents, relatives, or other responsible persons accompanying the child. The court must state on the record the reason for any adjournment. APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR. Release (before or after trial) of some of the juveniles detained under § 320.5(3)(b) may well be due to a different factor: the evidence against them may be insufficient to support a finding of guilt. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 687, 350 N.E.2d 906, 908 (1976) (requiring a showing of a "compelling State interest" to uphold § 320.5(3)(b)); cf. 689 F.2d at 372; see 513 F. Supp. 254-267. Ante at 467 U. S. 271. [Footnote 10] The court also held that appellees were not required to exhaust their state remedies before resorting to federal habeas, because the highest state court had already rejected an identical challenge to the juvenile preventive detention statute. Final Exam Juvenile Procedures SCHALL v. MARTIN Facts Martin was arrested on December 13, 1977, and charged with first-degree robbery, second-degree assault, and criminal possession of a weapon based on an incident in which he, with two others, allegedly hit a youth on the head with a loaded gun and stole his jacket and sneakers. D.C.Code §§ 23-1322(a)(1), (2) (1981). See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U. S. 67, 407 U. S. 80-81 (1972). A formal probable cause hearing is then held within a short while thereafter, if the factfinding hearing is not itself scheduled within three days. jurisprudence in light ofSchall, see Rosenberg, Schall v. Martin: A Child is a Child is a Child, 12 AM.]. An edited and abridged (easy to read) version of the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Schall v. Martin (1984) 467 U.S. 253. Schall v. Martin. ". We are generally chary of deciding important constitutional questions not reached by a lower court. If the case is subsequently adjusted, the petition is then dismissed. In fact, such actions reinforce the original finding that close supervision of the juvenile is required. Rather, the court invalidated a significant aspect of New York's juvenile justice system based solely on some case histories and a statistical study which appeared to show that, 689 F.2d at 369. Page 253. L.O.W. Family Court judges are not provided information regarding the behavior of juveniles over whose cases they have presided, so a judge has no way of refining the standards he employs in making detention decisions. Both of the courts below concluded that only occasionally and accidentally does pretrial detention of a juvenile under § 320.5(3)(b) prevent the commission of a crime. Ellen SCHALL, Commissioner of New York City Department of Juvenile Justice v. Gregory MARTIN et al. 265 (testimony of Judge Quinones). Numerous studies of that facility have attested to its unsavory characteristics. Ante at 467 U. S. 279. By Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Published on 10/01/83. The nonhearsay allegations in the delinquency petition and supporting depositions must establish probable cause to, believe the juvenile committed the offense. 513 F. Supp. No tenable concept of due process could condone a balance that gives so little weight to the accused's interest in pretrial liberty"). Schall v Martin. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 420 U. S. 113-114 (1975), we relied in part on the severity of "[t]he consequences of prolonged detention" in construing the Fourth Amendment to forbid pretrial incarceration of a suspect for an extended period of time without "a judicial determination of probable cause." Applying the principle that the strength of the state interest needed to legitimate a statute depends upon the degree to which the statute encroaches upon fundamental rights, see Williams v. Illinois, 399 U. S. 235, 399 U. S. 259-260, 262-263 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in result), it might be held that an important -- but not quite "compelling" -- objective is necessary to sustain § 320.5(3)(b). In Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1, 342 U. S. 4-5 (1951), we stressed the importance of a person's right to freedom until proved guilty in construing the Eighth Amendment to proscribe the setting of bail "at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to" assure the presence of the accused at trial. [Footnote 2/16] The majority concedes, as it must, that this principle applies to juveniles. at 698-699. Cf. § 43-255 (Supp.1982); Nev.Rev.Stat. 15 (1979); Minn.Stat. L. & C. 226, 229-231 (1978); Wenk, Robison, & Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted?, 18 Crime & Delinquency 393, 401 (1972); Preventive Detention: An Empirical Analysis, 6 Harv.Civ.Rights-Civ.Lib.L.Rev. Decision/opinion of the court Ruling U.S Supreme court reversed the U.S District court and Circuit court. 22 (1979); Standard Juvenile Court Act, Art. People ex rel. See 513 F. Supp. 513 F. Supp. There are some obvious practical impediments to adoption of the majority's proposal. In short, § 320.5(3)(b) as administered by the New York courts surely "appears excessive in relation to" the putatively legitimate objectives assigned to it. But he thought that the statute was procedurally infirm because it granted unbridled discretion to Family Court judges to make an inherently uncertain prediction of future criminal behavior. New York. at 149-150. overview of the schall opinion 645 iii. Three subsidiary findings undergird that conclusion. 5(3)(b)] shall be released forthwith." Cf. [Footnote 2/28] Thus, to protect the rights of the majority of juveniles whose incarceration advances no legitimate state interest, § 320.5(3)(b) must be held unconstitutional "on its face.". Detention need not be predicated on a finding that there is probable cause to believe the child committed the offense for which he was arrested. Ordinarily the judge has in addition the written report and recommendation of the probation officer. . The objectives of the probation officer conducting the interview are to determine the nature of the offense the child may have committed and to obtain some background information on him. . Ante at 467 U. S. 265. Lawaspect.com PETITIONER:Ellen Schall, Commissioner of New York City Department of Juvenile JusticeRESPONDENT:Gregory Martin, et al.LOCATION:Spofford Juvenile Center DOCKET NO. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d at 686, 350 N.E.2d at 907-908, in no way suggests that they would be willing to do so if an individual detainee challenged the constitutionality of § 320.5(3)(b) as applied to him. it is almost 2 pages long. at 716. See Petitioners' Exhibit lb. That the New York courts suspended their usual rules of mootness in order to consider an attack on the constitutionality of the statute as a whole, see People e rel. No. See, e.g., Citizens' Committee for Children of New York, Inc., Juvenile Detention Problems in New York City 3-4 (1970); J. [Footnote 2/24] The benefits even to those few juveniles who would have committed crimes if released are not unalloyed; the gains to them are partially offset by the aforementioned injuries. Section 320.5(3)(b) of the New York Family Court Act au-thorizes pretrial detention of an accused juvenile delinquent based on a finding that there is a "serious risk" that the child "may before the return date commit an act which if com- of HEW, Children's Bureau, Pub. The constitutional limitations upon the kinds of factors that may be relied on in making such decisions are significantly looser than those upon decisionmaking processes that abridge the liberty of presumptively innocent persons. Given the regulatory purpose for the detention and the procedural protections that precede its imposition, we conclude that § 320.5(3)(b) of the New York FCA is not invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At no point in this litigation have appellants offered an alternative selection of instances in which § 320.5(3)(b) has been invoked. at 285; Testimony of Mr. Benjamin, id. According to the Encyclopedia of the American Constitution, about its article titled 389 SCHALL v.MARTIN 467 U.S. 253 (1984) This is one of several cases showing that legal fictions infect juvenile proceedings involving criminal conduct. Schall v. Martin. . 689 F.2d at 377. ", Second, § 320.5(3)(b) is not limited to classes of juveniles whose past conduct suggests that they are substantially more likely than average juveniles to misbehave in the immediate future. Both courts below made this inference. Even more telling is the fact that "the vast majority" of persons detained under § 320.5(3)(b) are released either before or immediately after their trials. at 695-700, appellants did not dispute before the Court of Appeals the representativeness of the 34 cases, see Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 369, n.19 (CA2 1982). Id. 467 U.S. 253 (1984) 104 S.Ct. The initial appearance is informal, but the accused juvenile is given full notice of the charges against him and a complete stenographic record is kept of the hearing. . Testimony of Judge Quinones, App. Cf. The third and fourth suggestions are discussed in text, infra.. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 428 U. S. 274-275 (1976) (death sentence imposed by jury); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 442 U. S. 9-10 (1979) (grant of parole); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 408 U. S. 480 (1972) (parole revocation). App. First, Family Court judges are incapable of determining which of the juveniles who appear before them would commit offenses before their trials if left at large and which would not. Nonsecure detention involves an open facility in the community, a sort of "halfway house," without locks, bars, or security officers where the child receives schooling and counseling and has access to recreational facilities. In the present context, there is no need to choose between these doctrinal options, because § 320.5(3)(b) would fail either test. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. at 403 U. S. 548 (plurality opinion). People ex rel. 513 F. Supp. The figures in the text are taken from the District Court's summary of the 34 cases in the sample. Schall v. Martin b. in re Gault c. in re Winship d. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania. no particularized criteria." People ex rel. Section 320.5(3)(b) authorizes pretrial detention of an accused ju- N.Y.Penal Law §§ 10.00(18), 30.00(2) (McKinney Supp.1983-1984). See n 9, infra. Brief Fact Summary. The absence of any limitations on the sorts of reasons that may support a determination that a child is likely to commit a crime if released means that the statutory requirement that the judge state "reasons" on the record, see ante at 467 U. S. 276, does not meaningfully constrain the decisionmaking process. The procedural protections noted above are thus, in their view, unavailing, because the ultimate decision is intrinsically arbitrary and uncontrolled. benefited thereby, because they would not have committed crimes if left to their own devices (and thus would not have been exposed to the risk of physical injury or the perils of the cycle of recidivism, see ante at 467 U. S. 266). . [Footnote 2/22], Third, the courts below concluded that circumstances surrounding most of the cases in which § 320.5(3)(b) has been invoked strongly suggest that the detainee would not have committed a crime during the period before his trial if he had been released. [Footnote 24] In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. at 420 U. S. 114, we held that a judicial. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 by Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist and Publisher Originals. Strictly speaking, "guilt" is never adjudicated under the Act; nor is the juvenile ever given a trial. The majority refuses to consider the circumstances of these 34 cases, dismissing them as unrepresentative, ante at 467 U. S. 272, n. 21, and focuses instead on the lurid facts associated with the cases of the three named appellees. The lesson of this foray into the tangled provisions of the New York Family Court Act is that the majority ought to adhere to our usual policy of relying whenever possible for interpretation of a state statute upon courts better acquainted with its terms and applications. At the initial appearance, the court in its discretion may release the respondent or direct his detention. United States ex rel. In sum, the statutory scheme seems to contemplate that a motion to dismiss a petition for lack of probable cause, accompanied with "supporting affidavits, exhibits and memoranda of law," § 332.2(2), would be filed sometime after the juvenile is detained under § 320.5(3)(b). Testimony of Mr. Kelly (Deputy Commissioner of Operations, New York City Department of Juvenile Justice), App.
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